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ADJUDICATION OF CIVIL RICO
ACTIONS - STATE COURTS GET AN
OFFER THEY CAN'T REFUSE:
LOU v. BELZBERG
When a new cause of action is established through federal leg-
islation, Congress may grant jurisdiction over its subject matter to
both federal and state courts, or vest the courts of either system
with exclusive jurisdiction.1 If Congress is silent on the issue, it is
generally presumed that state courts share jurisdiction with federal
courts.2 This presumption may, however, be rebutted in one of
three ways: "by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable
implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility
between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests."3 The Rack-
' See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 428-31 (1866); Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 336-37 (1816); 1A-pt. 2 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL &
J. WICKER. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE T 0.201 (2d ed. 1987); Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70 HARv. L. REV. 509, 509 (1957). Congress has
determined that certain actions, such as cases arising under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, shall be adjudicated exclusively within the federal courts. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 10, at 35-36 (4th ed. 1983); Note, supra, at 509-10.
2 See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-79 (1981); see also Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962) (concurrent jurisdiction has been
the rule and exclusive jurisdiction the exception); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-39
(1876) (states have concurrent jurisdiction unless intent to grant exclusive jurisdiction is
clearly expressed or can be implied). The origins of this principle can be traced to Alexander
Hamilton, who stated in the Federalist papers that jurisdiction over federal causes of action
was generally intended to be concurrent. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 513-14 (A. Hamilton)
(Lodge ed. 1888); see Claflin, 93 U.S. at 138; Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal
Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 311, 314 (1976). This presumption is
based upon the relation between the state and national governments within the federal sys-
tem. See Gulf Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 478; Claflin, 93 U.S. at 136. "The two exercise
concurrent sovereignty .... Federal law confers rights binding on state courts, the subject-
matter jurisdiction of which is governed in the first instance by state laws." Gulf Offshore
Co., 453 U.S. at 478. Allowing state courts to entertain federal causes of action facilitates the
enforcement of federal rights. See M. WENDELL, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND
STATE COURTS 275-76 (1949). There has, however, been some discussion indicating that in
light of the changes in our federal system, the presumption should be reversed. See Redish
& Muench, supra, at 314-15.
3 Gulf Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 478; see Charles Dowd Box Co., 368 U.S. at 508. These
three factors have become the "settled test" for determining whether Congress has either
explicitly or implicitly confined jurisdiction to the federal courts. Rice v. Janovich, 109
Wash. 2d 48, 53, 742 P.2d 1230, 1233 (1987) (en banc); see, e.g., Valenzuela v. Kraft, 739
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eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO" or "the
Act") 4 created a civil remedy for private litigants injured by a vio-
lation of the Act's provisions against "racketeering activity."5 Al-
F.2d 434, 435 (9th Cir. 1984) (Gulf Offshore test provides analytical framework under which
to assess jurisdictional scope); Brandenburg v. First Md. Say. & Loan, 660 F. Supp. 717, 731
(D. Md. 1987) (same). In order to overcome the presumption there must be a strong showing
of need for exclusive federal jurisdiction. See Claflin, 93 U.S. at 136-37; Redish & Muench,
supra note 2, at 325 n.63.
Federal interests that may be incompatible with state court adjudication of a federal
cause of action include "the desirability of uniform interpretation, the expertise of federal
judges in federal law, and the assumed greater hospitality of federal courts to peculiarly
federal claims." Gulf Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 483-84; see also Redish & Muench, supra
note 2, at 329-35 (discussion of federal interests which may be impinged by state court
adjudication); Note, supra note 1, at 511-13 (same).
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 ("OCCA") is entitled "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1826 and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). The OCCA was
enacted for the purpose of eliminating "organized crime in the United States by strengthen-
ing the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions,
and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities
of those engaged in organized crime." 84 Stat. at 923 (Statement of Findings and Purpose).
For a full discussion of OCCA, see McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) or Its Crit-
ics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 Nom DAME LAW. 55 passim (1970).
RICO was enacted in response to congressional recognition of the increasing infiltration
of corrupt organizations into legitimate businesses. See Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies,
53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1014-15 (1980); McClellan, supra, at 140-41; Steinhouse, RICO: An In-
troduction and Description, 52 ANTrrRusT L.J. 303, 303-04 (1983). Generally, section 1962 of
RICO makes it unlawful for a person to participate in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs
through a "pattern of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962. A "pattern of racketeering
activity" requires the commission of two or more of the acts that section 1961(1) defines as
"racketeering activity" within a ten-year period. Id. § 1961(5). The acts enumerated in
RICO's section 1961(1) consist of twenty-four federal and eight state crimes. Id. § 1961(1).
Criminal penalties for the violation of section 1962 of the Act are provided in section 1963.
Id. § 1963. This Comment focuses primarily on RICO's civil provisions. For excellent analy-
ses of the Act's criminal provisions, see Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, pts. 1
& 2, 87 COLUM. L. Rav. 661, pts. 3 & 4, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 920 (1987); Tarlow, RICO Revis-
ited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291 (1983).
5 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Section 1964(c) provides: "Any person injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in
any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he
sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
RICO's civil remedy was intended to fill the gaps in civil and criminal laws in order to
provide the legitimate businessman redress for injuries he has suffered due to organized
crime. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 513-16 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 6693 (1969). The prospect of a recovery of
treble damages under section 1964(c) has provided private plaintiffs with the needed incen-
tive to bring actions against "racketeers." See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493; Loo & Kubo, Con-
current Jurisdiction for Civil Rico, 7 CAL. LAW., June 1987, at 81. Indeed, the treble damage
remedy has been criticized as responsible for the explosive increase of civil RICO cases that
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though the Act explicitly confers jurisdiction over civil RICO pro-
ceedings upon the federal courts,' there has been considerable
disagreement as to whether this authority is to be exercised con-
currently with state courts.7 Recently, in Lou v. Belzberg," the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
since the presumption in favor of concurrent jurisdiction was not
adequately rebutted, state and federal courts share adjudicatory
authority over private civil RICO actions.'
In Belzberg, A. Jacques Lou, a shareholder of Ashland Oil
Company ("Ashland"), filed a derivative action on behalf of Ash-
have been filed during the past five years. See Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Im-
propriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1101, 1103 (1982). In 1981, a full decade
after RICO's passage, there were only thirteen published RICO decisions; during the past
five years, however, approximately one thousand such opinions have been published.
Flumenbaum, Second Circuit Review, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 28, 1987, at 2, col. 2.
6 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982); see supra note 5 (discussion of provision).
Compare Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 662 F. Supp. 1507 (N.D. Cal.
1987) and Spence v. Flynt, 647 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Wyo. 1986) and Kinsey v. Nestor Explora-
tion Ltd., 604 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Wash. 1985) and County of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 574 F.
Supp. 902 (N.D. Ill. 1983), afl'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1985) and Green-
view Trading Co. v. Hershman & Leicher, P.C., 108 App. Div. 2d 468, 489 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1st
Dep't 1985) and Main Rusk Assocs. v. Interior Space Constructors, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 305
(Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (all holding that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction) with Bran-
denburg v. First Md. Sav. & Loan, 660 F. Supp. 717 (D. Md. 1987) and Contemporary Servs.
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 655 F. Supp. 885 (C.D. Cal. 1987) and Village Improvement
Ass'n v. Dow Chem. Co., 655 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. Pa. 1987) and Carman v. First Nat'l Bank,
642 F. Supp. 862 (W.D. Ky. 1986) and Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 710 P.2d
375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985) (all holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction).
See generally Knox, Jurisdiction and Civil RICO, 22 TORT & INs. L.J. 457 (1987) (examina-
tion of split in courts regarding jurisdiction over civil RICO).
The statutory language neither mandates exclusive federal jurisdiction, nor provides
that it be exercised concurrently by state and federal courts. See Brandenburg, 660 F. Supp.
at 730-31; Kinsey, 604 F. Supp. at 1370; Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 910, 710 P.2d at 378, 221 Cal.
Rptr. at 578. Furthermore, an examination of RICO's legislative history offers no insight
into the intent of Congress regarding this issue. See Intel Corp., 662 F. Supp. at 1511; Kin-
sey, 604 F. Supp. at 1370; see generally Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 488-92
(2d Cir. 1984) (discussion of Act's legislative history), rev'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 479
(1985); Blakey & Gettings, supra note 4, at 1014-21 (same). In fact, the principal draftsman
of RICO has asserted that "to [his] knowledge no one even thought of the issue." Flaherty,
Two States Lay Claim to RICO, Nat'l L.J., May 7, 1984, at 10, col. 2 (quoting Professor G.
Robert Blakey).
a 834 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988). The Ninth Circuit
was the first federal appellate court to directly address this issue. See id. at 735; Intel Corp.,
662 F. Supp. at 1509. Previously, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, in County of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 773 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1985), voiced doubts as to
whether RICO jurisdicton is exclusively federal, but failed to directly address the exclusivity
issue. Id. at 905 n.4.
I Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 738-39.
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land and initiated a class action on behalf of certain Ashland
shareholders in Los Angeles Superior Court.10 Lou alleged that the
defendants manipulated the price of Ashland stock in order to
earn extraordinary profits"" in violation of RICO 2 and section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.' s The defendants removed the
proceeding to the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California.'4 Lou then sought to remand the action, assert-
ing that section 17(a) claims brought in state court are not remova-
ble.15 The district court denied the motion, holding that the
pleadings had not adequately alleged a section 17(a) violation, 16
and that plaintiff's RICO claims were "separate and independent"
from her other claims, and thus removable. 7
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Lou's mo-
tion to remand.'8 First, the court noted that a private right of ac-
tion does not exist under section 17(a).' 9 Addressing Lou's RICO
claims, the court stated that a private RICO action is within the
original jurisdiction of the federal courts, and thus removable,2 °
10 Id. at 732.
11 Id. During early 1986, the defendants, members of the Belzberg family, accumulated
9.2 percent of Ashland common stock and offered to purchase the remaining outstanding
shares. Id. As a result, the price of Ashland stock increased. Id. Ashland then announced
that it had agreed to repurchase a portion of the stock from the Belzbergs, which caused the
price of the stock to fall. Id. The Belzbergs realized a substantial profit from these transac-
tions. Id.
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Lou also alleged a violation of state
law fiduciary obligations. Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 732.
13 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982). Section 17(a) makes it unlawful to offer or sell securities
through interstate commerce with the aid of "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud." Id.
§ 77q(a)(1).
14 Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 732. The Belzbergs' removal of Lou's claims was granted pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), (c) (1982). See id. Under section 1441(a), a civil action brought
in state court may be removed by the defendant to a federal district court if it is an action
over which the federal courts have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Section 1441(c)
provides that a "separate and independent" claim that would be removable if sued on alone,
may still be removable even if joined with a nonremovable claim. Id. § 1441(c).
15 Lou v. Belzberg, No. 86-2465, slip op. at 1-2 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 1986). "No case
arising under [the Securities Act of 1933] and brought in any State court... shall be re-
moved to any court of the United States." 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
'" Belzberg, No. 86-2465, slip op. at 2. The district court specifically held that Lou had
failed to allege she was a purchaser or seller of securities during the period in question. Id.
17 Id. at 3; see supra note 14 (discussion of statutory grounds for removal).
18 Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 741.
" Id. at 734. The Belzberg court relied on Puchall v. Houghton, Cluck, Coughlin &
Riley (In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig.), 823 F.2d 1349, 1358 (9th Cir.
1987) (en banc), which was decided after the Belzberg appeal had been filed. See Belzberg,
834 F.2d at 734.
20 Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 734; see supra note 14.
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provided the state court from which the claim was removed had
subject matter jurisdiction.21 The Ninth Circuit determined that
the states share adjudicative authority over civil RICO actions
with federal courts22 and, therefore, the Belzbergs' removal of
Lou's RICO claims was permissible.2"
Writing for the court, Judge Boochever acknowledged the pre-
sumption favoring concurrent jurisdiction2 4 and then proceeded to
address the three methods of its rebuttal.25 Looking first to the
language of the provision which created this private right of action,
section 1964(c) of the Act,26 the court found no explicit directive
from Congress precluding state adjudication. 7 Also, while the
court noted that RICO's legislative history is silent as to jurisdic-
tional requirements,28 it recognized that section 1964(c) of the Act
was consciously modeled after section 4 of the Clayton Act,29 which
has been consistently construed as conferring exclusive federal ju-
risdiction over private antitrust actions."0 Judge Boochever noted,
21 Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 734. The Belzberg court noted that the only potential bar to
the removal of Lou's action was the derivative jurisdiction doctrine. Id. According to this
doctrine, if a state court in which an action is originally brought has no jurisdiction, such as
when it is determined that jurisdiction is exclusively federal, the federal court to which the
action is removed also lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the suit. C. WRIGHT, supra note 1,
§ 38, at 212; see, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 662 F. Supp. 1507,
1512 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (jurisdiction over civil RICO exclusively federal, therefore case must
be dismissed under derivative jurisdiction doctrine); Spence v. Flynt, 647 F. Supp. 1266,
1269 (D. Wyo. 1986) (same). However, this doctrine has been modified by amendment, and
presently a federal court on removal is not precluded from adjudicating a claim simply be-
cause the state court from which it was removed lacked jurisdiction. See Pub. L. No. 99-336,
§ 3(a), 100 Stat. 637 (1986) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(e) (West Supp. 1987)). The
amendment applies only to claims brought on or after June 19, 1986, id. § 3(b), and was
therefore not applicable to this action. Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 734 n.1.
22 Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 738-39.
23 Id. at 739.
214 See id. at 735.
26 See id. at 735-39.
26 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). For the text of the provision, see supra note 5.
27 See Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 736. The Belzberg court noted "that the mere grant of
jurisdiction to a federal court does not operate to oust a state court from concurrent juris-
diction." See id. (quoting Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 479 (1981)).
26 Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 736.
2 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
15(a) (1982)). The language of the two statutes, at the time of RICO's enactment, was virtu-
ally identical. See Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 736 n.5. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provided that
"[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbid-
den in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States... and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained." Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat.
730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982)).
20 See, e.g., Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448, 451 n.6 (1943) (state court has no
1988]
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however, that the "mere borrowing of statutory language does not
imply" that RICO was to be interpreted in conformance with the
construction of the Clayton Act,31 especially in light of the congres-
sional mandate that RICO is to be accorded liberal construction.2
Finally, the court conceded that there is a federal interest involved
insofar as exclusive federal jurisdiction exists over various RICO
predicate acts,3 3 but asserted that this interest would not be jeop-
ardized by state court adjudication since the majority of RICO ac-
tions are based on state law fraud violations. 4
In concluding that the presumption favoring concurrent juris-
diction was not rebutted, the Ninth Circuit granted state courts
the authority to assert subject matter jurisdiction over federal
RICO claims, thus expanding the number of fora available to pri-
vate litigants. Despite the Belzberg court's consideration and rejec-
tion of the methods of rebuttal, it is submitted that the presump-
jurisdiction over Clayton Act claim) (citing Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 436, 440 (1920)); General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry.,
260 U.S. 261, 287 (1922) (federal antitrust claims under exclusive federal jurisdiction); see
also Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 128 App. Div. 2d 339, 344, 515 N.Y.S.2d 794, 797
(2d Dep't) (Spatt, J., dissenting) (comparing RICO and antitrust analogue, court notes ex-
clusive federal jurisdiction of the latter), appeal dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 708, 513 N.E.2d 1310
(1987); E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS § 5.01, at 40-41 (1965)
(federal courts vested with exclusive jurisdiction of private antitrust actions). But see Red-
ish & Muench, supra note 2, at 316-17 (questioning rationale of courts finding exclusive
federal antitrust jurisdiction).
31 Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 737 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 485,
498-99 (1985)). The Belzberg court relied on the Sedima decision, which rejected the pro-
position that the relationship between RICO and the Clayton Act warranted the application
of the Clayton Act's standing requirements to section 1964(c) of RICO. See Sedima, 473
U.S. at 485, 498-99.
32 See Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 737. The Act expressly states that its provisions "shall be
liberally construed to effectuate [RICO's] remedial purposes." Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a),
84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970).
11 Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 738; see supra note 4.
'3 Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 738 (quoting HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 637 F. Supp. 710, 717
(E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 828 F.2d 1071 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 706 (1988)). The court in HMK Corp. noted that a state court adjudicating a RICO
claim need only determine whether the alleged acts occurred and is thus not required to
interpret the underlying federal statutes. See HMK Corp., 637 F. Supp. at 717.
Application of RICO to situations not expressly anticipated by Congress, such as "gar-
den variety" fraud actions against so-called "legitimate" businesses, has resulted in criticism
of the Act. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499-500. One survey has indicated that "of the 270
known civil RICO cases at the trial court level, 40% involved securities fraud, 37% com-
mon-law fraud in a commercial or business setting, and only 9% 'allegations of criminal
activity of a type generally associated with professional criminals.'" Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499
n.16 (citing Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, A.B.A. Sec. of Corp., Banking &
Bus. L. 55-56 (1985) [hereinafter A.B.A. Report]).
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tion of state authority to entertain actions created under the
federal RICO statute is indeed rebutted. This Comment will dis-
cuss the unmistakable inference drawn from the Act's legislative
history foreclosing the exercise of state enforcement. In addition, it
will suggest that the Belzberg court ignored the existence of an
overwhelming federal interest which is incompatible with state
court adjudication over civil RICO matters. Finally, this Comment
will examine recent legislative proposals for the clarification of the
Act's civil provision.
THE CLAYTON ACT ANALOGY
As the court in Belzberg observed, the Act's legislative history
is silent as to whether RICO's grant of jurisdiction to the federal
district courts was intended to be exercised jointly with state
courts.35 There is, however, compelling evidence from the Act's leg-
islative history that section 4 of the Clayton Act served as the
model for RICO's section 1964(c).36 By modeling RICO's civil ac-
tion after the Clayton Act, it is submitted that Congress evinced
35 See Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 736; see also supra note 7 (discussing silence of legislative
history on issue of jurisdiction).
31 See Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S.30 and Related Proposals Relating to
the Control of Organized Crime in the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 538, 543-44 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClel-
lan). RICO's civil provision was added to Title IX in response to suggestions from the Amer-
ican Bar Association and legislators that there be a remedy "similar to the private damage
remedy found in the antitrust laws." Id. The then ABA president-elect, Edward L. Wright,
suggested an amendment "to include the additional civil remedy of authorizing private
damage suits based upon the concept of Section 4 of the Clayton Act." Id. at 543. Represen-
tative Poff, the chief spokesman for the bill, described the civil provision of RICO as "an-
other example of the antitrust remedy being adapted for use against organized criminality."
116 CONG. REc. 35,295 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff).
Courts and commentators have agreed that RICO's civil provision was consciously pat-
terned after the Clayton Act. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 662
F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (Congress expressly patterned civil RICO upon civil
antitrust legislation); County of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902, 912 (N.D. IlM. 1983)
(examining legislative history of RICO and finding intentional patterning after antitrust
laws), af'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1985); Village at Camelback Property
Owners Ass'n v. Carr, - Pa. Super.., _ _, 538 A.2d 528, 539 (1988) ("in drafting the
jurisdictional provision of RICO, -Congress consciously used language akin to that used in
Section 4 of the Clayton Act"); see also Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context:
Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DmA L. REV. 237, 249-80 (1982) (analyzing the
Act's legislative history); Nathan, Doubling the Treble Damage Option: What an Antitrust
Practitioner Needs to Know About RICO, 52 ANTrrRUST L.J. 327, 352-59 (1983) (antitrust
law provides guidelines for RICO actions as gleaned from legislative history); Parnon, RICO
Damages: Look to the Clayton Act, Not the Predicate Act, 21 CAL. W.L. REv. 348, 350
(1985) (civil RICO damages remedy "closely modeled" after antitrust provision).
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its intention that the construction given the Clayton Act serve as a
source of guidance in interpreting the civil RICO statute. Since the
courts have uniformly acknowledged that the Clayton Act's juris-
dictional provision confers exclusive jurisdiction over civil antitrust
claims upon the federal courts,37 it can therefore be inferred that
when the legislators enacted RICO, they were aware of the manner
in which the Clayton Act had been construed.3 8 Furthermore, it
would be anomalous to accord a different interpretation to lan-
guage that is virtually identical to that of the Clayton Act.3 9
The Belzberg court placed great emphasis on the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co.,10 which rejected the antitrust analogy due to the "obstacles" it
could create for potential RICO plaintiffs.4 1 The Sedima Court,
11 See C. JoNs, LITIGATING PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS § 21.01 (1984) (state courts
lack jurisdiction over federal antitrust claims); see also cases cited supra note 30.
See Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. at 912 ("[]egislators must have known" that identi-
cal language is construed to give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction); see also Levinson v.
American Accident Reins. Group, 503 A.2d 632, 635 (Del. Ch. 1985) ("it is an accepted prin-
ciple of statutory construction that the legislature has constructive knowledge of judicial
interpretations of existing statutes when drafting new legislation") (citation omitted).
Similarly, in determining whether a private right of action existed under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, the Supreme Court in Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677 (1979), noted that Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which had been construed as creating a private remedy. Id. at 694-96. Justice Ste-
vens, writing for the majority, concluded that "it is not only appropriate but also realistic to
presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with these.., precedents from.. . federal
courts and that it expected its enactment to be interpreted in conformity with them." Id. at
699.
" Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. at 912; see supra note 29.
-0 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (5-4 decision). See supra note 31 (discussing the Belzberg court's
reliance on Sedima). The Sedima Court addressed two issues regarding the standing re-
quirements of a private civil RICO suit. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493-95. The Court held
that it is not necessary to allege that a defendant has been convicted of a predicate act in
order to have standing under RICO. Id. at 493. In addition, Justice White, writing for the
Court, stated that unlike the Clayton Act, there is no requirement that a RICO plaintiff
establish a distinct "racketeering injury" in order to maintain a RICO action. Id. at 495. See
generally Blakey & Gettings, supra note 4, at 1040-43 (comparison of RICO and antitrust
standing requirements pre-Sedima).
4' Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498-99. In refusing to apply the "competitive injury" standing
requirement of antitrust law to RICO, the Sedima Court noted that RICO-like provisions
were originally proposed as an amendment to the Sherman Act and were not enacted. Id.;
see also Hartwell, Criminal RICO and Antitrust, 52 ANTrrRusT L.J. 311, 315 (1983) (legisla-
tive history of Sherman Act proposal). According to the Court in Sedima, this proposal was
not enacted because it could have "'create[d] inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in
the way of... a private litigant [who] would have to contend with a body of precedent-
appropriate in a purely antitrust context-setting strict requirements on questions such as
"standing to sue" and "proximate cause .... Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498 (quoting 115 CONG.
REc. 6995 (1969) (A.B.A. comments on S. 2048)). The Sedima Court concluded that borrow-
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however, did not address the jurisdictional issue;42 its discussion
was limited to the substantive, rather than procedural, elements of
RICO. 43 Indeed, Sedima confirmed the fact that RICO was pat-
terned after the Clayton Act." Therefore, it is submitted, Sedima
leaves unaffected the analogy between the procedural aspects of
the Clayton Act and RICO since the "obstacles" to which the
Sedima Court referred were related solely to RICO's substantive
coverage.
Moreover, it is suggested that the recent United States Su-
preme Court decisions in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Associates45 and Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon"
have reaffirmed the validity of the analogy between the two stat-
utes in construing the procedural dimensions of the civil actions
which they created. Searching for the appropriate statute of limita-
ing a "racketeering injury" requirement from antitrust law would create the same "obsta-
cles" Congress sought to avoid. Id. at 498-99.
In dismissing the analogy between the antitrust laws and RICO, the effect of the
Sedima decision is to undermine part of the rationale offered by courts finding in favor of
exclusivity. See, e.g., Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 128 App. Div. 2d 339, 352-53,
515 N.Y.S.2d 794, 803 (2d Dep't 1987) (Spatt, J., dissenting) ("[iln the aftermath of Sedima,
we can no longer, with assurance, analogize RICO with the antitrust legislation"), appeal
dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 708, 513 N.E.2d 1310 (1987); see also Barker, No Civil RICO Jurisdic-
tion in State Courts, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 1987, at 2, col. 5 ("lower courts could not be ...
confident that interpretations of the Clayton Act could simply be superimposed in RICO
cases").
42 See Simpson, 128 App. Div. 2d at 347, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
43 Barker, supra note 41, at 36, col. 4. The Simpson court asserted that the only conclu-
sion reached by the Sedima Court's review of the legislative history of RICO "is that the
antitrust principles defining the proximity between a plaintiff's injury and a defendant's
antitrust violation were not intended by Congress to be grafted onto the [Act's] provisions."
Simpson, 128 App. Div. 2d at 347, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 800. Justice Marshall, dissenting in
Sedima, argued that at most, RICO's early legislative history may be interpreted as a re-
fusal to perfunctorily adopt the standing requirements of antitrust plaintiffs. See Sedima,
473 U.S. at 512 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall went on to state that courts
relying on RICO's legislative "history to bar any analogy to the antitrust laws simply read
too much into the scant evidence available to us." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44 See Barker, supra note 41, at 36, col. 4. The Sedima Court stated that the "clearest
current" in the Act's legislative history is the reliance placed on the Clayton Act as a model.
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489. Professor Barker contends that the Court's confirmation of this
factor "could be interpreted as an endorsement of the proposition that Congress adopted
everything that went along with [the Clayton Act] procedurally, including court decisions on
jurisdiction." Barker, supra note 41, at 36, col. 4. But see Rice v. Janovich, 109 Wash. 2d 48,
54, 742 P.2d 1230, 1234 (1984) (en banc) (according to Sedima, "analogies to antitrust law
should not be interpreted to limit the availability or scope of RICO actions").
,5 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987).
40 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
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tions for civil RICO actions,47 the Court in Agency Holding noted
the similarities in purpose and structure between the statutes 8
and concluded that the Clayton Act offers the "closest analogy" to
civil RICO.49 Thus, in order to resolve disagreement among the
courts as to the appropriate limitations period governing civil
RICO actions,5" the Agency Holding Court adopted the Clayton
Act's four-year statute of limitations.5 1 Similarly, in Shearson, the
'1 See Agency Holding, 107 S. Ct. at 2762. RICO does not provide an express statute of
limitations to govern suits brought under its civil enforcement provision. See id.; see also
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 4, at 1047 (discussing statute of limitations applicable to
RICO actions). In the absence of a specific limitations period governing a federal cause of
action, the federal courts usually apply the most analogous state statute of limitations. Id.;
see Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980). But see Occidental Life Ins.
Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) (analogous state statute of limitations will not be
borrowed if its application fails to comport with federal policies underlying statute). Prior to
Agency Holding, federal courts had been unable to agree upon a consistent approach to
selecting the most analogous state statute of limitations for RICO claims. See Agency Hold-
ing, 107 S. Ct. at 2763; see also Note, Civil RICO: Searching for the Appropriate Statute of
Limitations in Actions Under Section 1964(c), 14 Loy. U. CHL L.J. 765, 782-88 (1983) (dis-
cussion of inconsistent approaches taken by the courts). The Agency Holding Court sought
to resolve this conflict by establishing a uniform limitations period for civil RICO. See
Agency Holding, 107 S. Ct. at 2771.
4' See Agency Holding, 107 S. Ct. at 2764-65. In discussing the similarities in purpose
of the two statutes, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated:
Both RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to remedy economic injury by pro-
viding for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees. Both statutes
bring to bear the pressure of "private attorneys general" on a serious national
problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate; the
mechanism chosen to reach the objective in both the Clayton Act and RICO is the
carrot of treble damages. Moreover, both statutes aim to compensate the same
type of injury; each requires that a plaintiff show injury "in his business or prop-
erty by reason of" a violation.
Id. at 2764.
49 Id. The Agency Holding Court asserted that the Clayton Act offered a closer analogy
to civil RICO than the criminal prosecution provisions of RICO and, therefore, declined to
adopt the five-year limitations period provided in RICO's criminal provisions. Id. at 2767;
see 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982).
50 See Note, supra note 47, at 782-88 (analyzing various approaches taken by courts).
Such inconsistency in the methods utilized by courts in ascertaining the applicable statute
of limitations has resulted in irreconcilable decisions. Compare Gilbert v. Bagley, [1983-1984
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 99,483 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 1982) (violations of
federal securities laws and RICO-court applied two-year state securities law limitations
period) with Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (same violations al-
leged as in Gilbert, yet court applied state's six-year fraud statute of limitations).
51 Agency Holding, 107 S. Ct. at 2767. See 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982). The Court based its
holding on the "need for a uniform statute of limitations for civil RICO." Agency Holding,
107 S. Ct. at 2767. A uniform limitations period is required to avoid uncertainty in the
application of RICO, id. at 2764, and to remedy the "confused, inconsistent, and unpredict-
able" state of the law regarding RICO's statute of limitations. Id. at 2763 (quoting A.B.A.
Report, supra note 34, at 391).
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Supreme Court relied on analogous antitrust precedent in deter-
mining that RICO claims are arbitrable.5 2 It is submitted, there-
fore, that the Belzberg court's analysis is flawed in light of the Su-
pkeme Court's recent affirmation of the relationship between the
procedural aspects of civil RICO and the Clayton Act.
In addition, several courts and commentators have utilized
Clayton Act precedent as guidance in construing other aspects of
the Act, including RICO's venue provision,5 the measure of dam-
ages available in a civil RICO suit," and the availability of equita-
ble relief to a private RICO litigant.5 5 It is suggested that this au-
thority supports the viability of the analogy between RICO and the
Clayton Act and that this relationship, and its recognition by the
promulgators of RICO, provide an unmistakable inference that
52 See Shearson, 107 S. Ct. at 2344-46. The parties in Shearson had entered a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement. Id. at 2335. Such agreements are valid and enforceable based
on the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), absent some evidence of congressional
intent excepting a particular statutory claim from the Arbitration Act or an irreconcilable
conflict between arbitration and a statute's underlying purpose. See Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). Justice O'Connor, writing
for the Court, found nothing in RICO's language or legislative history prohibiting arbitra-
tion of civil RICO claims. See Shearson, 107 S. Ct. at 2343-44. In determining whether
arbitration conflicts with RICO's purposes, the Shearson Court reasoned that its resolution
of this question with regard to the antitrust laws, in Mitsubishi, was applicable. See id. at
2344-46. The Court concluded that in accordance with its decision in Mitsubishi, agree-
ments to arbitrate claims brought as RICO suits are enforceable. See id. at 2345-46.
11 See Fricano, Civil RICO: An Antitrust Plaintiff's Considerations, 52 ANTTRUST L.J.
361, 366 (1983). RICO's venue provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (1982), and section 12 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982), are essentially identically drafted. Id. at 366; see County
of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902, 912 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 773
F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1984). Courts have interpreted RICO's venue provision to be supplemen-
tal to the general venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391-the same manner in which the Clay-
ton Act's provision has been construed. See Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F.
Supp. 1278, 1280-81 (D. Del. 1978).
54 See Parnon, supra note 36, at 350-51 (intent of Congress that Clayton Act measure
of damages apply in civil RICO cases). The legislative history of the Act gives no specific
indication as to how RICO damages should be measured. Id. at 348 n.4.
5 See Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1086-87 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987); Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576,
583 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Comment, RICO and Equitable Remedies Not Available for Private
Litigants, 21 CAL. W.L. REv. 385, 404-05 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, RICO and Equitable
Remedies]. But see Comment, Civil RICO: Should Private Plaintiffs Be Granted Equitable
Relief?, 18 PAc. L.J. 1199, 1216 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Civil RICO] (rejecting the
analogy between civil RICO and the Clayton Act). The Clayton Act, unlike RICO, expressly
provides that private litigants may be entitled to equitable relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982);
Comment, RICO and Equitable Remedies, supra, at 405. The court in Kaushal reasoned
that, had Congress intended to provide RICO plaintiffs with an equitable remedy, they
would have completed the analogy between RICO and the Clayton Act and expressly in-
cluded such a remedy. Kaushal, 556 F. Supp. at 583.
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subject matter jurisdiction under the Act is exclusively federal.
THE ACT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
Another factor to be considered in determining whether juris-
diction over a statute should be vested exclusively in federal courts
is the federal interest in the uniform application and interpreta-
tion of federal law.56 This factor will only be considered, however,
if it is first determined that the particular statute in question re-
quires uniformity. 57 If the nature of a statute is such that it is "suf-
ficiently detailed in its scope" then it is less likely that its provi-
sions will be subject to divergent judicial interpretations."
Conversely, if a federal statute provides the judiciary with "wide
latitude" in its development, the attainment of the requisite uni-
formity of interpretation would be difficult.5 9 If particular legisla-
tion demands a uniform construction to be effective, then jurisdic-
tion over its subject matter should be vested exclusively within the
federal courts, since the danger of its inconsistent construction
"will vary directly with the number of courts independently inter-
preting" its provisions.6 0
RICO has been described as one of the most sophisticated
statutes ever enacted by Congress.6 Due to its complex nature, the
Act has produced significant conflicting opinion regarding the ap-
5' See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1981); see also supra
note 3 (discussion of federal interests). It has been noted that this interest is so overwhelm-
ing that it calls into question the continuing vitality of the presumption favoring concurrent
jurisdiction. See Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 315.
" See Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 331-32.
" Id. at 331. One court has determined that RICO's elements are "indisputably de-
tailed and clear," and that the Act's legislative history provides "sufficient guidance to limit
the scope of judicial gloss." Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 915, 710 P.2d 375, 381,
221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 580-81 (1985) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496
n.4 (1985)). The Cianci court thus concluded that RICO does not require uniformity in its
interpretation and application. Id. at 914, 710 P.2d at 380, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 580. It is sub-
mitted that the Cianci court's conclusion is erroneous in light of the divergence of opinion
that has resulted from the judiciary's attempts to construe the many ambiguous provisions
of RICO. See infra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
" Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 331-32.
60 Id. at 332.
61 See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 4, at 1014. Due to RICO's "various terms of art"
and "numerous cross-references," one court has observed that the Act "is constructed on the
model of a treasure hunt." Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1984);
see Note, The Second Circuit Sedima Trilogy: Judicial Impatience with Private Civil
RICO, 51 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1037, 1047 (1985).
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plication and interpretation of its provisions.0 2 It is submitted that
the emergence of varied constructions of the Act indicates the need
for a more uniform approach to the interpretation of the civil
RICO statute.
In order to maintain a RICO suit under section 1964(c), a pri-
vate litigant must allege that he has been injured in his business or
property as a result of a violation of section 1962 of the Act.5 Vio-
lation of RICO's section 1962 may be summarized as requiring the
acquisition or maintenance of an enterprise through a "pattern of
racketeering activity. ' 64 A "pattern" may be established by the
commission of at least two of the acts specified in section 1961 of
RICO as constituting "racketeering activity." 5 There are, however,
conflicting interpretations of the definition of "pattern," specifi-
cally the operative language requiring "at least two acts. '"6 For ex-
ample, certain courts have maintained that two related acts of
racketeering activity within a single scheme form a "pattern. 67
Yet, other courts have required not only a relationship between the
62 See Greenview Trading Co. v. Hershman & Leicher, P.C., 108 App. Div. 2d 468, 472-
73, 489 N.Y.S.2d 502, 506 (1st Dep't 1985); Note, The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act: An Analysis of the Confusion in its Application and a Proposal for
Reform, 33 VAN. L. REv. 441, 448-76 (1980). Judge Pratt of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has described RICO's decisional law as a "mess," and stated
that "nothing is clear in this area except the obvious need for definitive and decisive direc-
tion." Furman v. Cirrito, 828 F.2d 898, 908, 910 (2d Cir. 1987) (Pratt, J., dissenting).
61 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982); supra note 5 (quoting language of the provision).
Brandenburg v. First Md. Say. & Loan, 660 F. Supp. 717, 725 (D. Md. 1987); see 18
U.S.C. § 1962 (1982); see also Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983)
(seven constituent elements of civil RICO cause of action), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025
(1984); supra note 4 (discussing elements of cause of action).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) (definition of "pattern of racketeering activity").
While "racketeering activity" is specifically defined in section 1961(1) of the Act, the term
"pattern" is not separately defined and is thus susceptible to various interpretations. See id.
§ 1961(1); Moran, The Meaning of Pattern in RICO, 62 CH[-]KENT L. REv. 139, 144 (1985).
0' See International Data Bank v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 154-55 (4th Cir. 1987); Moran,
supra note 65, at 153-58. Judge Pratt, in an effort to illustrate the conflict which exists,
enumerated recent district court decisions within the Second Circuit that have attempted to
construe the term "pattern." See Furman, 828 F.2d at 908-09 (Pratt, J., dissenting). In fact,
the Second Circuit recently ordered the en banc rehearing of two unrelated RICO cases in
order "to clarify Second Circuit law" on the requirements of a "pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity." Beauford v. Helmsley, 843 F.2d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 1988); see N.Y. Times, June 20,
1988, at B3, col. 5.
6' See United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 3229 (1987); Bank of Am. v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 971 (11th Cir. 1986);
R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985); Conan Properties, Inc.
v. Mattel, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1167, 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (mem.).
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acts, but also a series of separate schemes or episodes."8 This in-
consistency in defining the term "pattern" has permitted the ap-
plication of RICO to situations not intended by Congress. 69 Simi-
larly, courts have disagreed as to the elements necessary to
determine when a group of individuals engaged in illegal activities
would constitute an "enterprise. 7 0 There are also irreconcilable
decisions concerning the availability of equitable relief for a pri-
vate RICO litigant,7 1 and the survival of treble damage actions
subsequent to the death of an alleged wrongdoer.7 2 The injection of
68 See Lipin Enters. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 323-24 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc). Several
courts have provided that a civil RICO plaintiff must establish two separate "schemes" in
order to satisfy the pattern requirement. See Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257
(8th Cir. 1986); Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 831-33
(N.D. Ill. 1985). Other courts, however, base the pattern requirement on two separate "epi-
sodes" rather than "schemes." See Perfection Corp. v. Dresser Indus., 641 F. Supp. 782,
783-84 (W.D. Pa. 1986); Fleet Management Sys. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 627 F.
Supp. 550, 559-60 (C.D. IM. 1986). "An episode is apparently something more than an act of
racketeering activity but something less than a scheme." Lipin Enters., 803 F.2d at 324.
69 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985); Cianci v. Superior
Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 929-30, 710 P.2d 375, 391-92, 221 Cal. Rptr. 574, 591 (1985) (Lucas, J.,
dissenting). Due to the failure of the courts to develop a meaningful concept of "pattern,"
many civil RICO actions are being brought against legitimate businesses. Id. at 930, 710
P.2d at 391-92, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 591 (Lucas, J., dissenting); see supra note 34 (noting ma-
jority of civil RICO actions brought against legitimate businesses). RICO has been used for
the purposes of harassment and extortion of legitimate businesses and such businesses
"have a strong interest in settling even meritless cases" in order to avoid ruinous financial
exposure which may result by operation of RICO's treble damage provision. Cianci, 40 Cal.
3d at 929-30, 710 P.2d at 391-92, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
70 See United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir.) ("enterprise" must exist
for common purpose, function as continuing unit, and have ascertainable structure), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982); United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 999 (4th Cir. 1981)
(there must be evidence of common purpose), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156 (1982); see also
Brown, RICO Repercussions: Sedima and Haroco, 21 CAL. W.L. REv. 282, 286 (1985) (dis-
cussing "enterprise" concept); Note, supra note 61, at 1089-92 (same). The Act defines the
term "enterprise" as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."
18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
1 Compare Religious Technology Center v. Wolersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding private equitable relief not available), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987)
and Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576, 584 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (same) with
Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1541 (W.D. Pa. 1984)
(holding private equitable relief available). See generally Brown, supra note 70, at 286 (dis-
cussing equitable relief in RICO context); Curnow & Matloff, The Case for Divestiture to
Private Plaintiffs Under 18 U.S.C. Section 1964(a), 21 CAL. W.L. Rav. 302, 308-12 (1985)
(same); Comment, RICO and Equitable Remedies, supra note 55, at 390-99 (same); Com-
ment, Civil RICO, supra note 55, at 1218-22 (same); supra note 55 (authority utilizing Clay-
ton Act analogy to resolve conflict).
72 Compare Summers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 592 F. Supp. 1240, 1243 (W.D.
Okla. 1984) (treble damages are penal, therefore action does not survive death) with State
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state courts into this fray of discordant interpretation would only
compound an already complex situation. 3 Concurrent jurisdiction
increases the likelihood of further inconsistent interpretations of
RICO, and encourages forum shopping. 4 Furthermore, RICO's ap-
plication will become encumbered by an unworkable body of law,
thereby defeating its remedial purpose.75
It is suggested that the Belzberg court failed to recognize the
compelling federal interest in the uniform interpretation of the Act
when it determined that state and federal courts share jurisdiction
over civil RICO claims.7 1 Moreover, this overwhelming federal in-
terest is clearly incompatible with state court adjudication of
RICO actions, since exclusive federal jurisdiction would ensure a
more uniform approach to the construction and application of the
Act.
Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 682 (N.D. Ind. 1982)
(treble damages are remedial in nature and therefore action survives death).
73 See Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 930, 710 P.2d at 392, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 591 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting); Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 128 App. Div. 2d 339, 345, 515 N.Y.S.2d
794, 798 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 708, 513 N.E.2d 1310 (1987); Greenview
Trading Co. v. Hershman & Leicher, P.C., 108 App. Div. 2d 468, 472, 489 N.Y.S.2d 502, 506
(1st Dep't 1985). But see Brandenburg v. First Md. Sav. & Loan, 660 F. Supp. 717, 732 (D.
Md. 1987) (inconsistent results insufficient to rebut presumption of concurrent jurisdiction
since any aberrant decisions of state courts are reviewable, upon grant of certiorari, by
United States Supreme Court).
7 See Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 930, 710 P.2d 375, 392, 221 Cal. Rptr.
574, 591 (Lucas, J., dissenting); cf. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S.
Ct. 2759, 2766 (1987) (multiple state limitations periods present the danger of forum
shopping).
It is suggested that the possibility of forum shopping is further compounded by the fact
that 27 states have enacted their own "little RICO" statutes. See 133 CONG. REc. E3351
(daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987). For a compilation and description of most of these statutes, see
Cohen, State RICO Statutes, 4 RICO L. REP. 660, 660-62 (1986). Some courts have reasoned
that a state's enactment of its own "little RICO" statute is evidence that the state itself
does not believe its courts have concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving the federal
RICO statute. See Kinsey v. Nester Exploration Ltd., 604 F. Supp. 1365, 1370 (E.D. Wash.
1985). It is submitted, however, that this argument is not persuasive since some "little
RICO" statutes do not provide a civil remedy. See Cohen, supra, at 660-62.
7' See Bertz, Pursuing a Business Fraud RICO Claim, 21 CAL. W.L. REv. 246, 247-48
(1985); cf. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 4, at 1047 (discussing need for uniform limitations
period). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that RICO's "'remedial purposes'
are nowhere more evident than in the provision of a private action for those injured by
racketeering activity." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985).
7' The only federal interest recognized by the Belzberg court was that federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over several of RICO's predicate acts. See Belzberg, 834 F.2d at
738.
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LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR THE CLARIFICATION OF RICO
In recent years, several proposals for the amendment of RICO
have been introduced in Congress." Two of these proposals, H.R.
529078 and H.R. 3240, 7 have included provisions mandating exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction over civil RICO actions. H.R. 5290 was in-
troduced in 1986, but was not enacted into law.80 It is submitted,
however, that Congress' failure to enact this bill cannot be con-
strued as a rejection of exclusive federal jurisdiction. The focus of
the proposed bill was not on establishing RICO jurisdiction solely
within the federal courts, but on other, more controversial, sugges-
tions for reform.8 1 H.R. 3240, which is entitled the "Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1987," was introduced
by Representative Conyers and is presently under consideration by
the House Committee on the Judiciary.8 2 Significantly, Represen-
tative Conyers has described the section of the bill which provides
that jurisdiction be exclusively assigned to the federal courts as as-
suring that "the proper construction of RICO will not continue to
be in dispute."8 "
17 Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basis for Compromise, 71 MINN. L. REv. 827,
848-58 (1987); see RICO Bus. DIspuTEs GUIDE (CCH) 5 6041 (1988).
11 H.R. 5290, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1986). Section 5 of H.R. 5290 provided that-
"The United States district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of civil actions
under this subsection." Id. § 5(c)(6). For a reproduction of the bill, see Goldsmith, supra
note 77, at 896-99.
" H.R. 3240, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7, 133 CoNG. REc. E3351 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987).
H.R. 3240 states that: "Chapter 96 of title 18, United States Code, shall not be construed
... (3) to confer jurisdiction to hear a criminal or civil proceeding or action under its provi-
sions on a judicial or other forum of a State or local unit of government." Id. § 7(3).
80 See Goldsmith, supra note 77, at 849.
81 See id. at 896-99. The proposed amendment contained provisions which would have
adopted a two-year statute of limitations period, defined "pattern," and allowed only an
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ADJUDICATION OF CIVIL RICO
CONCLUSION
The rebuttable presumption favoring concurrent jurisdiction
recognizes both the legitimate role of state courts in enforcing fed-
erally granted rights, and the authority of Congress to preempt
this role by providing, either explicitly or implicitly, for such rights
to be protected exclusively within the federal court system. Para-
mount to proper application of this presumption is the correct as-
certainment of congressional intent, and the three accepted meth-
ods of rebutting the presumption appropriately focus the judicial
inquiry upon such intent. Despite the appropriateness of the ana-
lytical framework adopted by the Belzberg court, however, its reso-
lution of the case remains deeply flawed in that the application of
the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction yields, in the context of
civil RICO actions, a result directly contrary to that intended by
Congress. The passage of legislation such as that currently before
the House of Representatives is therefore highly recommended.
Until the passage of such clarifying legislation, or an overruling of
Belzberg by the Supreme Court, state court adjudication of civil
RICO claims can be expected to increase, and will thus increas-
ingly prevent the successful eradication of the evils RICO was in-
tended to combat.
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